Angling policy and property rights in France: an economic approach

Julien Salanié, Philippe Le Goffe and . Convention Catalysts International
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Philippe Le Goffe: ESR - Unité de recherche d'Économie et Sociologie Rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique
. Convention Catalysts International: Convention Catalysts International

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Abstract: Ronald Coase has shown that well-defined property rights and the absence of transaction costs ensure that bargaining can lead to efficient environment allocation. In France, as in most developed countries, fishing rights are well-defined and belong to land-owners. However in many cases these rights are traditionally given for free to anglers associations (AAPPMA). AAPPMA are the basic institutions in charge of angling management in France. In a first part we describe how private fishing rights are institutionally turned into public goods. This is the basis of the French democratic angling rule : fishing "everywhere, for everyons and at low cost". In a second part we analyze the economic drawbacks of foregone property rights. Two main external effects arise from the public nature of recreational fishing in France. First we deal with externalities between anglers, known as the "tragedy of the comrnons". Then we describe the extemal effects between land owners (mostly farmers) and anglers. This leads to pollution and loss of environmental services,

Keywords: Droits de pêche; salmon; re11al fishing; saumon; france; pêche loisir (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-05-21
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02338183v1
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Published in 3rd World Recreational Fishing Conference "Regional Experiences for Global Solutions", Convention Catalysts International., May 2002, Darwin, Australia. pp.97-100

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