Multi-dimensional rules

Sebastien Courtin () and Annick Laruelle ()
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Sebastien Courtin: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Highlights The decision structures aggregate the opinions of voters on several dimensions. Characterization of weighted multi-dimensional rules is provided. Some multi-dimensional rules are represented by a combination of single dimension rules. Links to the referendum paradox and the Ostrogorski paradox are made.AbstractThis paper deals with rules that specify the collective acceptance or rejection of a proposal with several dimensions. We introduce the notions of separability and weightedness in this context. We provide a partial characterization of separable rules and show the independence between separability and weightedness.

Keywords: Multi-dimensional rules; Weightedness; Separability relation; Decision making process (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02351433
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2020, 103, pp.1-7. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.10.001⟩

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Journal Article: Multi-dimensional rules (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02351433

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.10.001

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