Economic failures in French Recreational fishing management

Philippe Le Goffe and Julien Salanié
Additional contact information
Philippe Le Goffe: SMART-LERECO - Structures et Marché Agricoles, Ressources et Territoires - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AGROCAMPUS OUEST

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: In France, freshwater recreational fishing management does not account for anglers' satisfaction in a sufficient manner. On one hand, fishing effort is too high creating congestion costs. On the other, environmental quality is low while there is a positive willingness-to-pay for improvements. These inefficiencies are explained by the conjunction of three phenomena. First, private property rights are attenuated under institutional pressure. Second, recreational fishing is managed as an open access resource over the whole territory. Finally, halieutic policies focus on the protection of environmental resources and are inefficient to maximize the social rent provided by recreational fisheries. Fishing effort regulation and environmental services provision following the beneficiary-pays principle could improve collective welfare. Social pricing could insure equity in access to the resource.

Keywords: Droits de pêche; Demande récréative (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 2005, 48 (5), pp.651-664

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Economic Failures in French Recreational Fishing Management (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02364324

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().