A Shapley-based Groves mechanism: when the mechanism designer plays the wise man

Michela Chessa

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Abstract: We define these two mechanisms. The first one implements the Shapley value to define some monetary transfers, but it is not incentive compatible. The second one implements only in expectation the same solution and it is a Groves mechanism. While inheriting all the properties of this family, it is also budget-balanced (still in expectation). The trick is to ask the mechanism designer to insert/remove some utility and to take/give it back at the end.

Date: 2019-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02390679v1
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Published in Operations Research Letters, 2019, 47 (6), pp.560-564. ⟨10.1016/j.orl.2019.09.010⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02390679

DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2019.09.010

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