Impact of Say on Pay on Executive Compensation of Firms Listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange

Sylvie Berthelot, Vanessa Serret (), Jessica Sylvain and Michel Coulmont
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Sylvie Berthelot: UdeS - Université de Sherbrooke
Vanessa Serret: IREA - Institut de Recherche sur les Entreprises et les Administrations - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud
Jessica Sylvain: UdeS - Université de Sherbrooke
Michel Coulmont: UdeS - Université de Sherbrooke

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Abstract: Unlike in a number of other countries, the United Kingdom and the United States being two examples, SoP is not prescribed by regulation in Canada. To contribute to the debate on the relevance of a regulation adapted to the Canadian context, this article measures the impact of Say on Pay in firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange that voluntarily adopted this practice. Based on a sample of 45 firms, the study results show that the adoption of SoP does not improve the pay-performance relationship or lead to lower executive total compensation. These findings therefore raise questions about the effectiveness of Say on Pay as a governance tool.

Keywords: compensation; managerial power; performance; say on pay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02417538
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Published in International journal of business and management, 2015, 10, ⟨10.5539/ijbm.v10n12p40⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02417538

DOI: 10.5539/ijbm.v10n12p40

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