Parking enforcement and travel demand management

Romain Petiot ()
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Romain Petiot: GEREM - Groupe d'Étude et de Recherche en Économie Mathématique - UPVD - Université de Perpignan Via Domitia

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Abstract: This article deals with on-street, non-free parking policy. The aim is to show how parking meter violation challenges the travel demand management policy. The literature widely admits that only the increase in the enforcement effort both deters drivers from offending and contribute to moderating car use. Nevertheless, the link between parking non-compliance, enforcement effort and travel demand has never been examined. We show that when parking meter violation behaviour, fine level choice, modal split and travel demand are connected, the fine increase paradoxically supports car use and encourages parking violation in the case of large parking congestion in particular.

Keywords: Enforcement effort; Parking non-compliance; Parking behaviour; Parking policy; Modal choice; Travel policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-perp.hal.science/hal-02422664
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published in Transport Policy, 2004, 11 (4), pp.399-411. ⟨10.1016/j.tranpol.2004.07.003⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02422664

DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2004.07.003

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