Strategic information transmission with sender's approval

Françoise Forges () and Jérôme Renault
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Françoise Forges: LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres

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Abstract: We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to the receiver. We show that a partitional, (perfect Bayesian Nash) equilibrium exists if the sender has only two types or if the receiver's preferences over decisions do not depend on the type of the sender as long as the latter participates. The result does not extend: we construct a counter-example (with three types for the sender and type-dependent affine utility functions) in which there is no mixed equilibrium. In the three type case, we provide a full characterization of (possibly mediated) equilibria.

Keywords: Approval; Cheap talk; Sender–receiver game; Participation constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02440627v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in International Journal of Game Theory, inPress, 50 (2), ⟨10.1007/s00182-021-00757-1⟩

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Journal Article: Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02440627

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00757-1

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