Does Say-on-Pay have a deterrent effect on executive compensation? A Canadian study

Sylvie Berthelot, Michel Coulmont and Vanessa Serret ()
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Sylvie Berthelot: UdeS - Université de Sherbrooke
Michel Coulmont: UdeS - Université de Sherbrooke
Vanessa Serret: LEGO - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion de l'Ouest - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Brest - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - IBSHS - Institut Brestois des Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société - UBO - Université de Brest - UBL - Université Bretagne Loire - IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris]

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Date: 2017
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Published in 40th Annual Congress of The European Accounting Association, 2017, Valence, Spain

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02445029

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