Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion

Jérôme Mathis
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Jérôme Mathis: LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres, GREMAQ - Groupe de recherche en économie mathématique et quantitative - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on both players' preferences and information that can be certified for a Sender–Receiver game to possess a separating equilibrium, as well as sufficient conditions for every equilibrium of such a game to be separating. Accordingly, we generalize Seidmann and Winter's [D.J. Seidmann, E. Winter, Strategic information transmission with verifiable messages, Econometrica 65 (1997) 163–170] results to games with partial provability.

Keywords: Disclosure of certifiable information; Partial provability; Persuasion; Separating equilibrium; Verifiable types (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, 143 (1), ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02445381

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002

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