 Skills, preferences and rights: Evolutionary complementarities in labour organisationStefano Dughera ()
Post-Print from HAL Abstract: In this paper, we model the interaction between types of workers and organisations through evolutionary game theory. In particular, we compare two paradigms of work organisation: in the "hierarchical" regime, it is the organisation herself who makes all relevant decisions, leaving little autonomy to her employees. Conversely, modern "networks" empower their workforce with the right to take initiatives, modulate routines and use their general knowledge in an instrumental way. In our framework, the choice to decentralise decisions is driven by the interplay between three elements: the complexity of production, the employees' work preferences and skills and the labour-discipline implications of different organisational modes. By analysing a series of match-specific effects, we derive parametrisations for which centralisation dominates delegation and vice-versa. Explicit conditions under which the system remains stuck in Pareto-inferior situations are also obtained. Finally, we interpret our results to draw comments on the current contraction of job-discretion in OECD countries. Keywords: [No; keyword; available] (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2020 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02472905 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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