A Note on Democracy and Competition: The Role of Ownership Structure in a General Equilibrium Model with Vertical Preferences

Hend Ghazzai (), Wided Hemissi (), Rim Lahmandi-Ayed and Sana Kefi

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Abstract: This note extends the results already obtained by Khaloul et al. (2017) on the majority vote between monopoly and duopoly by a heterogeneous population composed of individuals who are potentially consumers, workers, and shareholders to the general case where firms are owned by a given proportion of the population. Results show that duopoly is preferred when non-shareholders constitute a majority of the population. Otherwise, the majority vote depends on the relative dispersion of the individuals with respect to their intensity of preference for quality and their sensitivity to effort.

Keywords: Imperfect Competition; Democracy; Vertical Differentiation; General Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-com
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2021

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Journal Article: Note on Democracy and Competition: The Role of Ownership Structure in a General Equilibrium Model with Vertical Preferences (2021)
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