 Optimal and Equilibrium Investment in the Intermittent Generation TechnologiesPost-Print from HAL Abstract: The paper analyses the development of the intermittent technologies to generate electricity, given the competition of incumbent generators using the conventional technologies. Various assumptions are considered regarding the market power of the incumbent generators. The paper shows that an optimal investment in the intermittent technologies can be implemented under perfect competition, provided that a complete system of competitive spot and forward markets exists. By constrast, if a single incumbent firm owns the conventional generators and has market power, the paper shows that the investment in the intermittent technologies will in general be inappropriate. If the conventional and the intermittent generators compete on the the spot and forward markets, the competitive fringe will invest too much in the intermittent technologies, if a large fraction of the consumers are on smart meters and intervene on the spot market. However, if the incumbent firm owns the transmission and distribution network, implying that the intermittent generators can only sell their electricity to the incumbent firm, the intermittent generators will not invest enough in the intermittent technologies. Keywords: Capacity Choice; Electricity; Intermittency; Market Power; Renewable Energy (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Revue d'économie politique, In press, 125 (3), pp.415-452. ⟨10.3917/redp.253.0415⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02486331 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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