Loi de Wagner et politiques culturelles: les vertus du bras armé

Pierre Cartigny () and Luc Champarnaud
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Luc Champarnaud: LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We compare the dynamic performance of two models of public intervention in the cultural sector : A centralized ministry'à la française' and a so-called arm's length bodies, more British. We study the solutions of a dynamic game where, by hypothesis, the agencies are likely to resist Wagner's law better than a central regulator, because they can disengage from public funding projects and thus approach the optimal dynamic. The non-cooperative behavior of the agencies creates strategic biases that the center can partially correct. The problem of quality is also addressed.

Date: 2020-04
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Published in Revue Française d'Economie, 2020, 34 (4), pp.3-24. ⟨10.3917/rfe.194.0003⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02497374

DOI: 10.3917/rfe.194.0003

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