Associated consistency, value and graphs

Gerard Hamiache and Florian Navarro

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Abstract: This article presents an axiomatic characterization of a new value for cooperative games with incomplete communication. The result is obtained by slight modifications of associated games proposed by Hamiache (Games Econ Behav 26:59–78, 1999; Int J Game Theory 30:279–289, 2001). This new associated game can be expressed as a matrix formula. We generate a series of successive associated games and show that its limit is an inessential game. Three axioms (associated consistency, inessential game, continuity) characterize a unique sharing rule. Combinatorial arguments and matrix tools provide a procedure to compute the solution. The new sharing rule coincides with the Shapley value when the communication is complete.

Date: 2019-06-20
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02501125
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Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2019, 49, pp.227-249. ⟨10.1007/s00182-019-00688-y⟩

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Journal Article: Associated consistency, value and graphs (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02501125

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00688-y

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