Implementing Pareto Optimal and Individually Rational Outcomes by Veto

Remzi Sanver

Post-Print from HAL

Keywords: Nash implementation; Veto mechanism; Two-person implementation; Implementation with awards (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-04
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Group Decision and Negotiation, 2018, 27 (2), pp.223-233. ⟨10.1007/s10726-018-9562-1⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Implementing Pareto Optimal and Individually Rational Outcomes by Veto (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02517252

DOI: 10.1007/s10726-018-9562-1

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().