Political sustainability and the design of social insurance

Georges Casamatta (), Helmuth Cremer and Pierre Pestieau
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Georges Casamatta: LISA - Laboratoire « Lieux, Identités, eSpaces, Activités » (UMR CNRS 6240 LISA) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Università di Corsica Pasquale Paoli [Université de Corse Pascal Paoli]

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Abstract: This paper examines how the issue of political support affects the design of social insurance. It distinguishes between redistributive character and size of social protection. Three main results emerge. First, it may be appropriate to adopt a system which is less redistributive than otherwise optimal, in order to ensure political support for an adequate level of coverage in the second (voting) stage. Second, supplementary private insurance may increase the welfare of the poor, even if it is effectively bought only by the rich. Third, the case for prohibiting (supplementary) private insurance may become stronger when the efficiency of private insurance markets increases.

Keywords: Social insurance; Political support (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (87)

Published in Journal of Public Economics, 2000, 75 (3), pp.341-364. ⟨10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00070-5⟩

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Journal Article: Political sustainability and the design of social insurance (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02520562

DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00070-5

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