The Political Economy of Redistributive Social Security

Georges Casamatta (), Helmuth Cremer and Pierre Pestieau
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Georges Casamatta: LISA - Laboratoire « Lieux, Identités, eSpaces, Activités » (UMR CNRS 6240 LISA) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Università di Corsica Pasquale Paoli [Université de Corse Pascal Paoli]

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Abstract: The aging of the population constitutes nowadays one of the most important economic problem facing our societies. Most pension systems in the developed countries are of the Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) type, which means that income is redistributed from the workers to the retirees. Because of falling mortality and fertility rates, the ratio of contributors to beneficiaries is decreasing. Consequently, governments must find solutions to ensure the financial viability of the PAYG systems. This means raising the retirement age, decreasing the replacement rate or increasing the ratio of contribution to the system.

Keywords: Majority Vote; Pension System; Condorcet Winner; Private Saving; PAYG Pension (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Institutional and Financial Incentives for Social Insurance, Springer US, 2002, 978-1-4615-0783-3. ⟨10.1007/978-1-4615-0783-3_11⟩

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Working Paper: The Political Economy of Redistributive Social Security (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02520593

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4615-0783-3_11

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