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Collective intelligence and co-dependent organization: the role of chartered accountants in crowdlending

Héloïse Berkowitz () and Antoine, Souchaud
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Héloïse Berkowitz: TSM - Toulouse School of Management Research - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - TSM - Toulouse School of Management - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse
Antoine, Souchaud: NEOMA - Neoma Business School

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Abstract: What role can chartered accountants (CAs) play in the use of collective intelligence in crowdlending and under what conditions? This article studies a failed attempt to use chartered accountants to exploit collective intelligence in a partnership between a crowdlending platform and the professional body for chartered accountants in France. Our results describe some of the actions used by CAs to activate various collective intelligence functions on the forums, both upstream and downstream of collection campaigns. We also reveal two organizational factors that explain the failure to exploit this resource, namely non-compliance with the co-dependence principle and organizational hypocrisy. Based on this analysis, we propose an extended co-dependence model between the platform, project owners, crowd, and chartered accountants, enabling an "engineering" of collective intelligence, i.e. its expression, transformation and exploitation.

Keywords: chartered accountant; collective intelligence; peer-to-peer lending; partial organization; co-dependent organization 2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-12-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ppm
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02525737v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Comptabilité Contrôle Audit / Accounting Auditing Control, 2019

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