Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication

Marie Laclau ()
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Marie Laclau: GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: I consider repeated games with local monitoring: each player observes his neighbors' moves only. Hence, monitoring is private and imperfect. Communication is private: each player can send different (costless) messages to different players. The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I prove that a folk theorem holds if and only if each player has two neighbors. This extends the result of Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996) to private communication, provided the existence of sequential equilibrium.

Date: 2013
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Published in Economics Letters, 2013, 120 (2), pp.332-337. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.002⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02552216

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.002

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