Can common ownership prevent the tragedy of the commons? An experimental investigation

Klarizze Puzon and Marc Willinger
Additional contact information
Klarizze Puzon: SLU - Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences = Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We study experimentally a two-stage common pool resource game. In the first stage, selected members of the group determine the level of protection for the resource. The protected fraction of the resource is equally shared among group members. In the second stage, the unprotected fraction of the resource is competed for. We consider three institutions varying in the extent by which subjects participate in the first stage: vote(all group members participate), dictator (only one member decides), and exogenous (no-one participates). We also vary the initial level of the resource: scarce or abundant. We establish the following results. First, we find that the voting institution provides more frequent protection and leads to higher protection levels than the dictatorial institution. In addition, higher protection tends to temper rent seeking for the unprotectedfraction of the resource for both institutions. Second, rent-seeking intensifies after a resource boom, but this effect is non-significant under the vote institution. Finally, rent-seeking is larger when the level of the resource is high, but this tendency is sharply reduced under the vote institution

Keywords: voting; commons; natural resources; property rights; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Review of Behavioral Economics, inPress, ⟨10.2139/ssrn.3410383⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Can Common Ownership Prevent the Tragedy of the Commons? An Experimental Investigation (2020)
Working Paper: Can common ownership prevent the tragedy of the commons? An experimental investigation (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02554976

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3410383

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().