La politique antitrust et les législations économiques

Jacques Fontanel ()
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Jacques Fontanel: CESICE - Centre d'études sur la sécurité internationale et les coopérations européennes - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble

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Abstract: Legislation concerning antitrust policy differs from country to country. They often evolve and there is already a large body of evolving case law.... In Europe, the Commission has a broad competence in competition matters. It has opposed national champions and industrial or service activities run by a monopoly. It controls abuses of dominant positions and the decisions of national public authorities. These decisions are often challenged and sometimes even invalidated. Since 2004, the Commission has delegated certain powers to the National Competition Agencies, while remaining firmly in control.

Keywords: Commission européenne; politique antitrust; monopole; ententes industrielles; antitrust policy; European Commission; monopoly; industrial cartels (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/hal-02556323v1
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Published in Analyse des politiques économiques, Université Pierre Mendes France de Grenoble, 2004

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02556323

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