Convincing consumers to share personal data: double-edged effect of offering money

Valentine Weydert, Pierre Desmet and Caroline Lancelot Miltgen ()
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Pierre Desmet: DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, ESSEC Business School
Caroline Lancelot Miltgen: Audencia Recherche - Audencia Business School

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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how offering control on data usage and offering money can increase willingness to share private information with a data broker. Design/methodology/approach Personal data are collected for internet users with a Web questionnaire. In an experimental framework, compensations control money are manipulated and consumers' data sharing is explained by sensitivity and regulatory focus. Findings Offering control increases willingness to disclose personal data, even sensitive one, but the effect is not moderated by regulatory focus. Offering monetary compensation has a negative, but small, effect on willingness to share personal data, and the effect is moderated by regulatory focus.

Keywords: Control; Privacy; Regulatory focus; Data sharing; Monetary compensation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08-26
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02566613v1
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Published in Journal of Consumer Marketing, 2019, 37 (1), pp.1-9. ⟨10.1108/JCM-06-2018-2724⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02566613

DOI: 10.1108/JCM-06-2018-2724

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