Heterogeneity in a class of two-player games

Hétérogénéité dans une classe à deux joueurs

Charles Figuieres and Frédéric Rychen ()
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Frédéric Rychen: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In two-player games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule of thumb has to be amended if the game features strategic substitutability.

Date: 2011
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02643026v1
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Published in Economics Bulletin, 2011, 31 (1), pp.426-435

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Related works:
Journal Article: Heterogeneity in a Class of Two-Player Games (2011)
Working Paper: Heterogeneity in a Class of Two-Players Games (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02643026

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