Emission permit trading between imperfectly competitive product markets

Guy Meunier

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Abstract: The present paper analyzes the efficiency of emission permit trading between two imperfectly competitive product markets. Even if firms are price takers in permit markets, the integration of permit markets can decrease welfare because of imperfect competition in product markets. If there is asymmetric information between the regulator and firms, the integration of the permit markets could have a positive effect related to the flexibility of an integrated market; this flexibility can justify integrating the permit markets.

Keywords: ASYMETRIE D'INFORMATION; EMISSION PERMIT MARKET; DEMAND UNCERTAINTY; IMPERFECT COMPETITION; MARKET INTEGRATION; MARCHE DE PERMIS D'EMISSION; CONCURRENCE IMPARFAITE; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published in Environmental and Resource Economics, 2011, 50 (3), pp.347-364. ⟨10.1007/s10640-011-9475-9⟩

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Journal Article: Emission Permit Trading Between Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02646970

DOI: 10.1007/s10640-011-9475-9

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