Can a specific performance contract solve the hold-up problem?

Un contrat à obligation d’exécution peut-il résoudre le problème du hold-up ?

M’hand Fares ()
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M’hand Fares: AGIR - AGroécologie, Innovations, teRritoires - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Toulouse INP - Institut National Polytechnique (Toulouse) - UT - Université de Toulouse, UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

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Abstract: This paper aims to define the conditions under which a specific performance contract can solve the hold-up problem. We mainly show two results. First, in a very general environment the efficient solution is achieved only with renegotiation design. Second, in a specific environment where the valuation functions satisfy a separability condition, the efficient solution is implemented only because there is an equivalence result between this condition and a state independence assumption. This implies that a specific performance contrat is unecessary since a voluntary contract is also able to achieve efficiency.

Keywords: Hold up; contrat à obligation d’exécution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02647357v1
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Published in Revue Economique, 2011, 62 (3), pp.545-556. ⟨10.3917/reco.623.0545⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02647357

DOI: 10.3917/reco.623.0545

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