Simulation of negociation process and land planning: the case of the Thau laguna territory

Simulation des négociations et intercommunalité sur l’étang de Thau

Patrick Rio and Sophie Thoyer ()
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Patrick Rio: LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier

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Abstract: Public policies have evolved towards greater devolution of land and urban planning decisions, as well as natural resource management, to local stakeholders and local communities. . However, local elected representatives are often left without much guidance on the way they should promote and organize the negotiations between the local councils concerned by a common agenda on these issues. This article develops a multilateral bargaining model to simulate the outcomes of the negotiations, for various structures of the negotiation. Local preferences for land and urban planning options are revealed through an econometric analysis of past choices made by elected city councils, based on a politician-voter model. The article illustrates the feasibility of this modelling approach by applying it to the case of the Thau laguna territory (South East of France). water management, land planning, negotiations, bargaining model, preference function

Date: 2010
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Published in Économie rurale, 2010, 316, pp.3-20

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02654398

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