Assurance santé et sélection adverse. L’incidence des maladies invalidantes

David Alary and Franck Bien
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David Alary: LERNA - Economie des Ressources Naturelles - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CEA - Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives
Franck Bien: Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres

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Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of chronic diseases on insurance contracts with adverse selection. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the introduction of chronic diseases influences the equilibrium of insurance market. We characterize conditions such that first best contracts can be optimal with asymmetric information.

Date: 2008
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Published in Revue Economique, 2008, 59 (4), pp.737-748. ⟨10.3917/reco.594.0737⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02657461

DOI: 10.3917/reco.594.0737

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