Climate agreement: concessions and ratifications

Accord climatique: concessions et ratifications

Pierre Courtois and Tarik Tazdaït

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Abstract: We consider a bargaining game aiming at the full ratification of a climate treaty. Three distinct coalitions are considered: a pro-regime coalition, the so-called Kyoto group, an anti-regime coalition made of the countries rejecting the Kyoto protocol and the G77 coalition made of developing countries. We assume that the pro-regime coalition wants to ratify the treaty as such while the two other coalitions condition ratification to further concessions. Employing an alternating offers model, we study the concession the pro-regime coalition should make for the others to accept ratify the treaty. We show that the more binding is the ratification constraint of the pro-regime coalition, the lowest is the concession. Conversely, the more binding the ratification constraints of the two adverse coalitions, the highest should be the concession.

Keywords: RATIFICATION; PAYS EN DEVELOPPEMENT; ACCORD CLIMATIQUE; CONCESSION; COALITION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Published in Revue Economique, 2008, 59 (4), pp.719-735. ⟨10.3917/reco.594.0719⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02658287

DOI: 10.3917/reco.594.0719

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