Designing multi-unit multiple bid auctions: an agent-based computational model of uniform, discriminatory and generalised Vickrey Auctions

Le format des enchères multi-unitaires: un modèle de simulation des enchères à prix uniforme, discriminant et Vickrey généralisé

Atakelty Hailu and Sophie Thoyer ()
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Atakelty Hailu: University of South Australia

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Abstract: Multi-unit auctions are being used by public agencies to allocate resources and to purchase services. These auctions resolve the lumpy bid problem inherent in single-bid auctions by allowing bidders to submit a supply or demand schedule. However, the choice of pricing formats for multi-unit auctions is controversial. Neither economic theory nor laboratory experiments depict a complete picture of how alternative pricing formats perform in terms of budgetary or allocative efficiency. This paper constructs an agent-based computational model to compare uniform, discriminatory and generalised Vickrey pricing formats under different degrees of competition and heterogeneity in the bidder population.

Keywords: agent-based modelling; reinforcement learning; computational experiments; enchere; procurement auctions; multi-unit auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02664994v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published in Economic Record, 2007, 83 (S1), pp.S57-S72. ⟨10.1111/j.1475-4932.2007.00410.x⟩

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Journal Article: Designing Multi‐unit Multiple Bid Auctions: An Agent‐based Computational Model of Uniform, Discriminatory and Generalised Vickrey Auctions (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02664994

DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4932.2007.00410.x

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