Incentive to encourage downstream competition under bilateral oligopoly

[Incitation d'une firme amont à favoriser la concurrence en aval dans le cadre d'un oligopole bilatéral]

Stéphane Caprice
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Stéphane Caprice: Station d'économie et sociologie rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique

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Abstract: Consider the contracting problem of an input supplier dealing with several firms that compete in an output market. We show that, contrary to the key result of the previous literature, an input supplier's profit can increase with the number of downstream firms if the upstream firm is not a monopolist but instead competes with an alternative inferior supplier.

Keywords: BILATERAL OLIGOPOLY; MULTILATERAL VERTICAL CONTRACTING; RENT-SHIFTING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02676111v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Economics Bulletin, 2005, 12 (9), pp.1-5

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02676111

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