Théorie des contrats et réseaux de franchise: analyse et enseignements

Thierry Pénard, Emmanuel Raynaud () and Stephane Saussier

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Contract Theories and Franchising Franchising is an excellent field of application for contract theories. This paper aims at surveying the recent literature on franchise chains and contracts. It focuses on the choice of contractual terms (the « contractual design ») with an emphasis on incentive mechanisms, the choice of organizational form (vertical integration versus franchising), and « contractual mix », i.e. system in which both company-owned units and franchised units exist side by side. For each of these issues, we present both a theoretical overview and empirical tests (when they exist).

Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in 2004, 18 (4), pp.151-191. ⟨10.3406/rfeco.2004.1538⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02680532

DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.2004.1538

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().