Joint Ownership of Production Projects as a Commitment Device against Interest Groups

Nicoletta Berardi and Paul Seabright
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Paul Seabright: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: This paper investigates an unexplored rationale for joint ownership of a production project. We model projects with autocorrelated productivity shocks as creating an option value of investing over time so that later investments benefit from the information revealed by the realization of earlier investments. However, internal and external interest groups may pressurize owners into paying out early revenues. Joint ownership provides a commitment mechanism against them, thereby enabling more efficient levels of investment. The Business Environment and Enterprises Performance survey data corroborate the model's prediction that organizations under interest-group lobbying pressure are more likely to choose joint ownership.

Date: 2020-02-12
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Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2020, 176 (3), pp.572-594. ⟨10.1628/jite-2020-0027⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: Joint Ownership of Production Projects as a Commitment Device against Interest Groups (2022)
Journal Article: Joint Ownership of Production Projects as a Commitment Device against Interest Groups (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02794373

DOI: 10.1628/jite-2020-0027

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