Naturalism and Moral Conventionalism

Cyril Hédoin

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Abstract: This article provides a critical examination of Ken Binmore's theory of the social contract in light of philosophical discussions about moral naturalism and moral conventionalism. Binmore's account builds on the popular philosophical device of the original position but gives it a naturalistic twist. I argue that this makes it vulnerable to moral skepticism. I explore a possible answer to the moral skeptic's challenge, building on the fact that Binmore's account displays a variant of moral conventionalism. I ultimately conclude however that the conventionalist answer leads to a purely behaviorist view of morality, which implies that there is nothing special about morality and fairness norms. I propose alternative interpretations of conventionalism. These accounts escape most of the difficulties because they place emphasis on the reasons that establish a moral convention.

Keywords: Binmore; moral naturalism; moral conventionalism; original position; fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07-19
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Published in Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 2018, 11 (1), pp.50-79. ⟨10.23941/ejpe.v11i1.246⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02865576

DOI: 10.23941/ejpe.v11i1.246

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