Collective intentionality in economics: making Searle's theory of institutional facts relevant for game theory

Cyril Hédoin

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Abstract: Economic theories of team reasoning build on the assumption that agents can sometimes behave according to beliefs or preferences attributed to a group or a team. In this paper, I propose a different framework to introduce collective intentionality into game theory. I build on John Searle's account, which makes collective intentionality constitutive of institutional facts. I show that as soon as one accepts that institutions (conventions, social norms, legal rules) are required to solve indetermination problems in a game, it is necessary to assume a form of collective intentionality that comes from what I call a common understanding of the situation among the players. This common understanding embodies the epistemic requirements for an institution to be a correlated equilibrium in a game. As a consequence, I question recent claims made by some economists according to which game-theoretic accounts of institutions do not need to assume collective intentionality.

Keywords: Collective intentionality; economics; Searle's theory; institutional facts; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05-20
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 2013, 6 (1), pp.1-27. ⟨10.23941/ejpe.v6i1.117⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02866225

DOI: 10.23941/ejpe.v6i1.117

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