Did Veblen Generalize Darwinism (And Why Does It Matter)?

Cyril Hédoin

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper examines the claim that Veblen's theory of cultural evolution has generalized Darwinian principles to socioeconomic phenomena. Our argument takes place in the debate around "generalized Darwinism" in evolutionary and institutional economics. We claim that Veblen frequently relied on the concept of selection and considered institutions both as units and as factors of selection. We also argue that some of Veblen's insights can be clarified by expressing them in evolutionary-game theoretic terms. Thus, we suggest a close connection between the ontological framework of generalized Darwinism and the technical study of evolutionary phenomena through evolutionary game theory.

Keywords: evolutionary game theory; generalized Darwinism; institutions; selection; Veblen (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Economic Issues, 2014, 44 (4), pp.963-990. ⟨10.2753/JEI0021-3624440406⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Did Veblen Generalize Darwinism (And Why Does It Matter)? (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02866237

DOI: 10.2753/JEI0021-3624440406

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().