The quality effect of intra-firm bargaining with endogenous worker flows

Tristan-Pierre Maury and Fabien Tripier ()
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Fabien Tripier: EPEE - Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Economiques - UEVE - Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne

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Abstract: The performance of the labor market depends not only on the quantity of jobs in the economy, but also on the quality of jobs. This paper proposes a new theoretical explanation of the job quality issue in search and matching models. We develop a matching and intra-firm bargaining model in which large firms hire workers and decide to destroy low-productivity job–worker matches. The sources of inefficiency include the well-known quantitative effect of intra-firm bargaining, namely, the excessive size of the firms concerned; and a new quality effect, namely, the poor quality of the job–worker matches selected by firms. © IAET

Keywords: intra-firm bargaining; matching; worker flow (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-06
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Published in International Journal of Economic Theory, 2018, 15 (2), pp.183--207. ⟨10.1111/ijet.12164⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02877944

DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12164

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