Les choix économiques entre les actions individuelles et l’action collective

Jacques Fontanel ()
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Jacques Fontanel: CESICE - Centre d'études sur la sécurité internationale et les coopérations européennes - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble

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Abstract: Game theory demonstrates the value of cooperation for economic actors. Co-operation is likely to produce better results than competition. The State must define these property rights, taking into account the external effects that can have harmful effects on the community as a whole. Unique models of rights must be defined wherever possible in order to maximize the value of production, as the costs of bargaining are high. It is therefore necessary to accept some limitation of individual freedom through regulation. The analysis of the contract between the state and citizens in terms of property rights makes it possible to find a social balance. The optimal allocation of resources and the aggregation of preferences are studied on the basis of the optimality principle of Pareto, the Hicks and Kaldor compensation tests and the question of the aggregation of the preference function.

Keywords: Economic choices; individual choices; collective choices; economic optimum; cooperation; contract; Choix économiques; choix individuels; choix collectifs; optimum économique; contrat (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/hal-02878256v1
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Published in Les fondements de l’action économique de l’Etat, Université Pierre Mendès France Grenoble, 2000

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