Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games

Sylvain Sorin and Cheng Wan
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Cheng Wan: IMJ - Institut de Mathématiques de Jussieu - UPMC - Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris 6 - UPD7 - Université Paris Diderot - Paris 7 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This work studies a new strategic game called delegation game. A delegation game is associated to a basic game with a finite number of players where each player has a finite integer weight and her strategy consists in dividing it into several integer parts and assigning each part to one subset of finitely many facilities. In the associated delegation game, a player divides her weight into several integer parts, commits each part to an independent delegate and collects the sum of their payoffs in the basic game played by these delegates. Delegation equilibrium payoffs, consistent delegation equilibrium payoffs and consistent chains inducing these ones in a delegation game are defined. Several examples are provided.

Keywords: basic integer-splitting game; delegation game; delegation equilibrium payoffs; consistent delegation equilibrium payoffs; consistent chains (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02885954v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in RAIRO - Operations Research, 2013, 47 (1), pp.47-58. ⟨10.1051/ro/2013026⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02885954

DOI: 10.1051/ro/2013026

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