Short- & long-term effects of monetary and non-monetary incentives to cooperate in public good games: An experiment

Mathieu Lefebvre and Anne Stenger ()
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Anne Stenger: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: Using a common experimental framework, this paper addresses both the question of the short-term and the long-lasting effects of temporary monetary and non-monetary incentive mechanisms on increasing individual contributions to the public good. The results show that both punishments and rewards significantly increase contributions compared to the baseline, but that monetary sanctions lead to the highest contributions, whereas non-monetary sanctions lead to the lowest contributions. The four types of incentives display long-lasting effects, i.e., contributions do not go back to baseline levels directly after the withdrawal of the incentives. However, rewards appear to have much stronger persistent effects than sanctions, revealing some sort of delayed reciprocity.

Keywords: Incentive mechanisms; Monetary; Public good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01-17
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in PLoS ONE, 2020, 15 (1), pp.e0227360. ⟨10.1371/journal.pone.0227360⟩

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Journal Article: Short- & long-term effects of monetary and non-monetary incentives to cooperate in public good games: An experiment (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02893436

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0227360

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