Informational nudges and public goods in networks

Benjamin Ouvrard () and Anne Stenger ()
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Benjamin Ouvrard: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Anne Stenger: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We present a model of voluntary contributions for a local public good, with individuals in a fixed network. We consider the introduction of an informational nudge, and model individuals' reaction to the nudge using a moral cost function. Regardless of the regulator's level of information, an informational nudge may induce higher levels of aggregate contributions in circle and complete networks, and reduces strategic uncertainty, as long as individuals' sensitivity to the nudge is high enough (contrary to the star and line networks). If in star and line networks agents' sensitivity to the nudge also matters, the regulator's degree of knowledge regarding each individual position in the network becomes crucial, as the efficiency of our nudge is lowered under incomplete information (it is not possible to send personalized information to each agent). Our main conclusion is therefore that a nudge policy should target specific individuals (those being the most sensitive to the nudge or having the highest interest for the public good) in specific networks (those in which each agent should contribute the same). We finally discuss some ethical concerns related to nudge implementation because of their potential for manipulation.

Keywords: Information disclosure; Local public goods; Moral cost; Network; Nudge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10-14
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy, 2019, 9 (3), pp.281-303. ⟨10.1080/21606544.2019.1676826⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02893454

DOI: 10.1080/21606544.2019.1676826

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