Stratégie des compagnies pétrolières internationales et partage de la rente: le cas du Congo

Olivier Lamotte and Thomas Porcher

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Abstract: This article investigates how the oil rent is shared between multinational corporations and host countries. Based on the case of Congo we show that asymmetric information between the actors constitutes a major component of the bargaining of oil contracts, which in turn affects the revenues of the producing countries.

Date: 2011
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Published in Revue management & avenir, 2011, 42 (2), pp.310. ⟨10.3917/mav.042.0310⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02907106

DOI: 10.3917/mav.042.0310

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