 Can product differentiation mitigate conflicts of interest between principal stakeholders? A cournot-bertrand comparisonNicolas Le Pape and Yongying Wang () Post-Print from HAL Abstract: This paper aims to investigate the impact of product differentiation on the extent of conflict of interest between principal stakeholders (shareholders, employees, and consumers), which is one of the most important concerns of stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. We consider a differentiated duopoly competing either in price or quantity after the wages of employees are negotiated with a labor union. We find that price competition and quantity competition have drastically different implications on whether product differentiation mitigates stakeholders' conflicts. Specifically, product differentiation can mitigate stakeholders' conflicts when firms compete in price, but not when they compete in quantity. Therefore, the product differentiation effect in mitigating stakeholders' conflicts differs across markets characterized by price competition versus quantity competition. Keywords: Stakeholders; Corporate governance; Product differentiation; Wage bargaining; Cournot; Bertrand (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Economic Modelling, 2020, 91, pp.341-346. ⟨10.1016/j.econmod.2020.06.016⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02929060 DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2020.06.016 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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