Cooperation Between Terrorist Groups: Behaviors and Strategies

Sylvain Baumann ()
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Sylvain Baumann: EDEHN - Equipe d'Economie Le Havre Normandie - ULH - Université Le Havre Normandie - NU - Normandie Université

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Abstract: This article presents some model of cooperation between terrorist groups through a game-theoretic view in order to study their strategies. It is relevant to consider several cases corresponding to the presence or not of an international organization, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to analyze their behavior.

Keywords: Security; Terrorism; Conflict; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02949071
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Published in Review of Integrative Business and Economics Research, 2020, 9 (Supplementary Issue 1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02949071

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