Protection, Technological Transfer and Alliance against Terrorist Conflict

Sylvain Baumann ()
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Sylvain Baumann: EDEHN - Equipe d'Economie Le Havre Normandie - ULH - Université Le Havre Normandie - NU - Normandie Université

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Abstract: This paper investigates the defensive measures of a government threatened by a terrorist organization. Some authors have studied only the alliance with a neighbouring country to protect from an external attack. This is the reason why our model focuses on a possible coalition with a terrorist group even if this cooperation is frowned upon by the international community. The second model deals with the protection technology. Indeed, the alliance between countries enables the transfer of such a protection. The example of the NATO justifies this analysis because of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Then, we show that helping a threatened country leads to negative externalities due to this collaboration. The effects of the parameters differ, resulting in the optimal choice of the targeted country concerning its security.

Keywords: Conflict Resolution; Alliance; Protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02949083
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Published in Review of Integrative Business and Economics Research, 2018, 6

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