Spying Solution In The Framework Of Terrorist Conflicts

Sylvain Baumann ()
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Sylvain Baumann: EDEHN - Equipe d'Economie Le Havre Normandie - ULH - Université Le Havre Normandie - NU - Normandie Université

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Abstract: Common knowledge is not always available for all kinds of games. When this information is reachable for players, experimental evidences consider that the Nash Solution is not played by humans: all players are not rational. It leads to a behavioral equilibrium which depends on this private information. The aim of this paper is to introduce new concepts of solution and to explain the interest of the spying in the framework of terrorist conflicts.

Keywords: altruism; terrorist conflict; spying game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02949086v1
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Published in Rev. Integr. Bus. Econ. Res, 2017, 5

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