A new rationale for not picking low hanging fruits: The separation of ownership and control

Denis Claude (denis_claude_economics@yahoo.fr) and Mabel Tidball (mabel.tidball@inrae.fr)
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Denis Claude: LEDi - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dijon [Dijon] - UB - Université de Bourgogne - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]
Mabel Tidball: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement

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Abstract: Recent attempts at explaining the energy-efficiency gap rely on considerations re-lated to organizational and behavioral/cognitive failures. In this paper, we build on the strategicdelegation literature to advance a complementary explanation. It is shown that strategic marketinteraction may encourage business owners to instill a bias against energy efficiency in manage-rial compensation contracts. Since managers respond to financial incentives, their decisions willreflect this bias, resulting in lack of investment.

Keywords: Energy efficiency; strategic delegation; behavioral bias; energy paradox (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Published in Environmental Modelling and Assessment, inPress, 26 (6), pp.985-998. ⟨10.1007/s10666-020-09735-5⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02959430

DOI: 10.1007/s10666-020-09735-5

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