Les effets pervers de la politique incitative: l’exemple de l’assurance maladie complémentaire

Philippe Batifoulier, Jean-Paul Domin () and P. Abécassis ()
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Jean-Paul Domin: REGARDS - Recherches en Économie Gestion AgroRessources Durabilité Santé- EA 6292 - URCA - Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne - MSH-URCA - Maison des Sciences Humaines de Champagne-Ardenne - URCA - Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne
P. Abécassis: CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - Université Sorbonne Paris Nord

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Abstract: This article looks at recent transformations of the health care system in France. The development of incentive-based mechanisms has today become the cornerstone of health policy in order to induce patients to restrict over-consumption. The transfer of an ever-increasing part of expenses onto complementary health insurance is quite telling in this respect. It also leads to new inequalities which compound pre-existing ones. These shortcomings have led law-makers to mitigate their policy by exempting some patients from contributing to the funding of their own health care costs. However, these noteworthy arrangements have not alleviated the dilemma of the efficiency vs. equity debate concerning health policy.

Date: 2010
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Published in Économie appliquée : archives de l'Institut de science économique appliquée, 2010, 63 (4), pp.171-194

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02963187

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