Convergence in games with continua of equilibria

Sebastian Bervoets and Mathieu Faure ()

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Abstract: In game theory, the question of convergence of dynamical systems to the set of Nash equilibria has often been tackled. When the game admits a continuum of Nash equilibria, however, a natural and challenging question is whether convergence to the set of Nash equilibria implies convergence to a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we introduce a technique developed in Bhat and Bernstein (2003) as a useful way to answer this question. We illustrate it with the best-response dynamics in the local public good game played on a network, where continua of Nash equilibria often appear.

Keywords: Convergence; Continua of Nash equilibria; Best-response dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-10
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Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020, 90, pp.25-30. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.006⟩

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Journal Article: Convergence in games with continua of equilibria (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02964989

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.006

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