Les paradis fiscaux. Le commerce de la souveraineté nationale

Jacques Fontanel ()
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Jacques Fontanel: CESICE - Centre d'études sur la sécurité internationale et les coopérations européennes - IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019]

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Abstract: The states of tax havens commercialise their national sovereignty to offer the largest international firms the opportunity to conduct a policy of tax avoidance and optimisation The result is a reduction in the means of public services, indebtedness of the victim states, a system of unfair international competition, the rise of inequalities to unequal levels, the violence of injustice, but also a great difficulty in changing the path of economic growth which boldly devastates nature, destroys natural wealth for good and, with climate change, makes life for mankind on Earth increasingly uncertain.

Keywords: Public debt; unfair competition; public services; tax haven; tax; multinational firm; Paradis fiscaux; firmes multinationales; services publics; compétition déloyale; impôts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04-07
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Published in Marché et Etat, Apr 2016, Saint-Petersbourg, Russie

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