Group cooperation against a hegemon

Guillaume Cheikbossian

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Abstract: In this paper, I study the ability of a group of citizens to cooperate against a hegemon in a repeated contest game and where group members and the hegemon have different valuations of the prize. I first consider that group members use grim trigger strategies (GTSs) to support cooperative behavior and show that full cooperation within the group is more easily sustained as a stationary subgame perfect (Nash) equilibrium (SSPE) as either group size or the heterogeneity in the valuation of the prize increases. In turn, I show that full cooperation within the group can also be sustained as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRPE). However, an increase in group size makes it more difficult to sustain within-group cooperation, but an increase in the relative valuation of the prize by group members still facilitates group cooperation

Keywords: Collective action; group cooperation; renegotiation; repeated game; trigger strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Published in Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2021, 33 (1), pp.25-55. ⟨10.1177/0951629820963177⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02973824

DOI: 10.1177/0951629820963177

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